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Abstract
In Information Sharing Theory of Dialogue (ISTD) [11, 12, 10], a dialogue is considered as a
circular object. However, circular objects have five classes of circularity problems. In this paper we
shall show and solve five circularity problems by means of ISTD. We shall formulate problematic
objects, and show a method of construction of models which does not contain these problematic
objects.
1 Introduction
Whether you can treat the Liar paradox properly is a touchstone of modeling truth. Similarly, proper
treatments of circularity are touchstones for modeling dialogue from the viewpoint of information sharing.
We call such models Information Sharing Theory of Dialogue (ISTD) [11, 12, 10]. Coherence Problems,
Well-Groundedness Problems, Finite Updatability Problems and Mis-collapse Problems. We shall use the
methods of [5, 8] in order to define circular objects and to formulate mental representation of dialogues.
We shall formulate problematic objects, and show a method of construction of models which does not
contain these problematic objects. In other words, we investigate how to characterize shared information
as a circular object.
In section 2, we shall characterize five classes of circularity problems in information sharing in dia-
logues. In section 3, we shall show solutions to these classes of the problems. Section 4 is the conclusion.
2 Four Classes of Circularity Problems in Information Sharing
in Dialogues
2.1 Coherence Problems and Well-Groundedness Problems
Coherence problems are problems of characterizability of coherence in circular objects. For example,
proper treatments of the Liar Paradox are Coherence Problems of theories of truth. In theories of
dialogue, to treat the following type of dialogues properly is a Coherence Problem.
(1) A: You don't know what(ever) (now) I know.
B: I know it.
A knows that B doesn't know whatever A knows. B knows that B doesn't know whatever A knows. It
follows the contradiction. We call information expressed in such dialogues circularly incoherent informa-
tion.
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Well-Groundedness Problems are problems of characterizability of informationality over circular ob-
jects. For example, the Truth-teller in [5] (s : [Tr p.]) = pd is not an obstacle to modeling truth, though
it has no substantive information and is circular. So we need to remove such thing as the followings from
our models. We call information expressed in such dialogues anti-grounded information. The following
examples are of anti-grounded dialogues.
(2) A: I know what you know.
B: That's what I know.
2.2 Finite Updatability Problems
Suppose A communicates with B. Firstly A sent the message 'the USSR collapsed.' Secondly B received
the message, and sent the message 'I accepted that the USSR collapsed' to inform the acceptance of the
message to A. However A in turn must send 'I accepted that you accepted that the USSR collapsed'
because A must inform the acceptance of the previous message sent from B. To think inductively, this
communication would continue infinitely. That is,
(3) A: The USSR collapsed.
B: I accepted that the USSR collapsed.
A: I accepted that you accepted that the USSR collapsed.
B: I accepted that you accepted that I accepted that the USSR collapsed.
Thus we can not update or revise our knowledge in communication. However, there is no such commu-
nication in our world at all. Normally, our communication is finitely terminatable.
(4) A: The USSR collapsed.
B: Uh huh.
(5) A: The USSR collapsed.
B: I know that.
This is an example of Finite Updatability Problems.
2.3 Mis-collapse Problems
In theories of verbal communication (e.g., [81) the content of an utterance `(p' by an agent A is usually
formulated as 'A knows (p", where (p' is the content of sentence (p. Therefore, when the utterance
succeeds in a dialogue, the conversants share that A knows cp' . If the dialogue is the most successful one,
the conversants share cp', rather than that. [9] proposes Collapse Axiom in order to fill this gap, i.e., A
and B share that A knows (p' if A and B share that (p'. However, this axiom is not valid but contingent.
If it is valid, then the following two dialogues must be equivalent in terms of the shared content.
(6) A: You know I know the USSR collapsed.
B: Uh huh.
(7) A: The USSR collapsed.
B: Uh huh.
For, the content 'A and B share that A knows that B knows that A knows that the USSR collapsed' is
equivalent to the content 'A and B share that A knows the USSR collpased', if the axiom is valid. This
is an example of Mis-collapse Problems.
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3 Outline of Solutions
In order to give solutions to four classes of circularity problems on ISTD, firstly, we shall model proposi-
tions, models, and discourse representations. This modeling is based on Situation Theory and Discourse
Representation Theory [5, 3, 8].
3.1 Modeling Propositions
In [5, 3]'s Austinian model of propositions, a proposition is analyzed as a complex object: (s : T), where
s is a situation which referes to the situation described by a type T. We define two classes: types
(TYPE), and propositions (PROP) from atoms: individuals I ND = {ussr, A, B}, relations RE L
{Collapse, Know, Share, Exist, USSR}, and situations SIT = {50 , s1,...,s,t, u, ...}.
Definition 1 Let TYPE, PROP be the largest classes satisfying:
• T E TYPE is of one of the following forms: (1) (Collapse, ussr; 1), for short [Collapse ussr] or (2)
(Know, T, p; 1) , for short, [KTp], or (3) (Know, T, p; 0) , for short, [KTp], or (4) (Share, {T,U},P;1),
for short, [ST,up], or (5) (Exist,ussr; 1), for short, [E ussr], or (6) (USSR,ussr, 1), for short,
[USSR ussr], or (7) X, p; 1), for short, [X p], where T, U, E {A, B}, and p C PROP. 77- is
the dual of T, vice versa. A basic type T E BTY PE is either (1), (4), (5), or (6).
• p E PROP (an atomic proposition) is a tuple (:, s, T; 1), for short (s : T), where s E SIT, T E
TYPE. A basic proposition p E BPROP is an atomic proposition of which type is basic. If
p = (s : a) then sit(p) = s and type(p) = a. 	 0
If we add the indeterminates of individuals I. {x, y, z, xo, ...}, situations S= {s, t, u, so, ...}, and propo-
sitions P= {p, q, r, po, ...} to the primitives, the generated types, propositions, and atomic propositions
are notated as ParTYPE, ParPROP. If an object contains an indeterminate, we call it a parametric
object.
To show the existence of PROP (and TYPE), suppose a operations (I), such that (I) : P H (BPROPU
{(:, s, (Know, x, p; i); 1)1.s E SIT, x E {A, B},p C P, i E {1, 0}} U {(:, s, (Share, {A, B},p; 1); i)is E
SIT,pC P} U {(:, 1); 1)1s E SIT; X, {p} C P}, which realizes the definition of PROP. Since
(1) is set-continuous in [2]'s sense, it follows that it has the largest fixed points and the smallest fixed points,
and the largest fixed point, (1)(P') = P°° = PROP and TYPE = {T1(:, s, T; 1) E PROP for some s E
SIT} .0
3.2 Modeling Shared Information
A circular object can be specified by a systems of equations. Similarly circular propositions are specified
as solutions of system of equations of propositions.
Common knowledge and its relatives, mutual belief and shared information, can be formulated in
three ways, according to Barwise [3]. Although the iterate approach has no finite representation of it,
the other approaches have their finite representation, and we can reformulate two of them as systems of
equations of propositions as follows:
• the fixed point approach: (a) A and B share that p iff A knows that ((a) and p) and B knows that ((a)
and p). , i.e., (s : SA,BP) 4 #. there is a solution of the equation {q = (s : KA ({p, (s : K B ({p, q}))}))},
or {q = (s : KA ({p, r})), r = (s : K B ({p, CM)} (these are equivalent).
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• the shared-situation approach: In a situation s A and B share p if in s, 13, A knows s and B knows
s' i.e., (s : SA,B (s : p)) there is a solution of {q = (s : KA ({(s : p), (s : KB ({(s : p), (I}))N}, or
{q = (s : KA ({(s : p), r})), r = (s : KB ({(s : p), CM)} (these are equivalent).
Barwise compared these approaches and concluded that the shared-situation approach is the most ap-
propriate one. As we can define the shared-situation approach in terms of systems of equations, the
shared-situation approach is a special case of the fixed point approach. We adopt the fixed point ap-
proach as the definition of shared information, since its expressive power is less than the fixed point
approach. Henceforth, we shall omit propositions (s : SA,BP), and instead of the propositions, we shall
use specifications by systems of equations of propositions, or CDRS' we shall define in the next subsection.
3.3 Modeling Mental Representation of Dialogue
We define a mental representation of a dialogue, a circular discourse representation structure (CDRS),
firstly introduced in [12, 10], constructed from a dialogue in a similar way to [8]. This representation
intervenes between a model-theoretic model and discourse generated by the Construction Algorithm and
it may refer the representaiton itself, and is another finite representation of circular objects.
A CDRS D produced by an agent from dialogue b between A and B at a situation u is a complex se-
quence, (label(D), dom(D), cond(D), i), where label(D) is the propositional indeterminate which denotes
D itself, D, dorn(D) is a sequence of the indeterminates occur in D, cond(D) is a sequence of parametric
propositions, CDRS's, or equations of indeterminates, and i E {Open, Close}, which means a mode of
CDRS's, produced by the following procedure, the Construction Algorithm of CDRS's.
1. Open a new CDRS D, and push u, A, and B to dom(D) and u : K A D, u : KB D to cond(D);
2. Push u : Kxp to cad(D) and a new proposition indeterminate p to dom(D), if the utterer is X;
and open a new innner CDRS p:
(a) Repalce a definite noun phrase or a pronoun by a new indeterminate x and push x to dom(p)
and push a new indeterminate y to dom(D) or link x to an appropriate indeterminate y in
dorn(D) and push the equation of them to cond(p):
(b) Repalce a relative clause ((() what(ever)
	 where n is a subjectless sentence, by a new
proposition indeterminate and push it dom(p) and push a condition ((q riq' to cond(p);
(c) Repalce the tensed verb by the tenseless morpheme prefixed by a new situation indeterminate
t of it and push the indeterminate to dom(p). If the processer thinks that t is shared, then
push it a new indeterminate of the sort to dom(D) and push the equation of them to cond(p):
(d) Close CDRS p if the hearer acknowledges the utterance.
(e) Close CDRS p and push p = D to cond(D) if the hearer agrees the utterance.
3. Close CDRS D if the conversants quit the dialogue. q
CDRS D represents the shared objects between the conversants. CDRS p means the content of an
utterance. A CDRS is successful if it and all of its subCDRS are closed.
Example 1 We can construct CDRS D, which has the following notation by nested boxes, from the
u, A, B, p, x
u : KAD u : KBD
u : K Q p
y,t
(t : y collapse)
y : USSR
y = x
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dialogue (4).
D:
3.4 Models and the Semantics of CDRS'
We must characterize the notion of coherence and groundedness in an appropriate form for circular
objects. Firstly, we introduce the notion of epistemical dependency and mutual dependency between
subsetes of PROP. Secondly, we define the notion of epistemic model, which excludes incoherence in any
mutual dependency and non-well-groundedness. Finaly, we define the semantics of CDRS'.
Definition 2 M is epistemically subordinate to A I., written M
	
if (s : (Know, x, M; j)) E A I. M
is epistemically dependent on A I, written M if there is a chain of M M' M is
mutually dependent on A r, written M N if M N and N 
-4‹ M. The mutual dependency chain of
M is the set Mchain(M) = {NAM N}. q
Definition 3 A model M E Mod is a sequence of subsets of PROP, i.e.,
• UM fl BPROP 0 (well-groundedness),
• For any n, M (n) contains no basic proposition and its dual,
• For any s, x, M(n), (s : (Know, x, M(n); 0)) M chain(M(n)),
• if	 q, p' E M(n) and for some substitution 0, p' = p0, then q0 E M(n). (deductively closedness)
The semantics of CDRS' is defined as follows.
Definition 4 A CDRS D is true in a model M, written M D, satisfying the following conditions:
• M	 (Di
 : Di )	 for some g, for any co E cand(Di ), M(i) w[g], and for any xE dcrtn(Di ),(s :
E(a)) E M(i) and a = g(x),
• M(i) J (Di : D.j )[g] .#>, for any cio E cond(Di), M(j) (p[g], and for any xE dom(Di), (s : E(a)) E
M(j) and a = g(x),
• M(i) (s : KxDA[g] 4#. (s : K A M(j)) E M(i), where s = g(s), A = g(x),
• M(i) (s : x knowpi )[g1	 (s : KA M (j))
 E M (i), where s = g(s), A = g(x),
• M(i) (s : x not knowpAg] < (s : KA M(j)) E M(i), where s = g(s), A = g(x),
• M(i)	 (s : x collapse)[g]	 (s : Collapse a) E M, where s = g(s), a = g(x),
• M (i ) (s : p q)[g] 4 (s :	 q) E M, where s = g(s),p= g(p), q = g(11),
• M(i)	 (x = y)[g] ‘g> g(x) = g(y),
• M(i) (Di = Dk)[g] .4=> M(j) = M(k). q
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u : K A D u : KBD
u : KAp
q,t,s,y
t = u
p; (t : A know q)	 (t : B not know q)(s : y collapse)
y: USSR
y=x
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3.5 Modeling Deduction of Information from Circular Propositions
To define the information which a CDRS has, we define the deducibility of information from it.
Definition 5 The deducibility relation F- is a subclass of CDRS x ParPROP satisfying the following
condit2ons:
1. If p E cond(D) and p E Par BPROP then D F- p*,
2. D (s : Kxp) iff D' p and (s : KxD') cond(D),
3. D F- (s : SA,Bp) if for some D', D" , (s : KID') E cond(D), D' p, (s : 1‘,19") E cond(D'),
D" F- p, and D" (s : SA,BP), where x, y E {A, B} and x Y,
4. If	 q E D, D p', for some substitution 0, p0 = p', then D q0,
5. DI-pAqiffDF-pandDl-q,
where p4 is a initialized form of p, i.e., for any indeterminate x contained in p E cond(D), if x y E
cond(D), then p4 is the substituted form of p by the equation. D is coherent if D (s : T) A (s : 7) for
some s and T. The set of consequences from D, Cn(D) = {Pip p}. CDRS's D 1 , D2 are said to be
inferentially equivalent, written D 1 a- D2, iffCn(Di) = Cn(D2 ) and Cn(Di) 0 and Cn(D 2 )  0. q
Strictly saying, I- is a mixed fixed point of some operations. On conditions 1,2,4,5, F- is the smallest fixed
point, however on condition 3, F- is the largest fixed point. For the existence of such a mixed fixed point,
see [4].
Example 2 The following dialogue is incoherent.
A: You don't know whatever (now) I know. The USSR collapsed.
B: Oh, yes.
The CDRS of this dialogue is:
D:
u, A, B, p, x
p = D
This CDRS is incoherent, since D 1-- B know (s : y collapse)) and D F- B not know (s : y collapse)). q
The characterization of information by is not appropriate if a CDRS D contains no basic propositions,
since Cn(D) = 0. Any circular dialogue contains no basic propositions. So all CDRS' of circular dialogues
can not be compared in terms of E.
p: (t : y collapsed)
y = x
Furthermore, the infinite approximation of a CDRS, like as: Doc, : is
u, A, B, x Do,
P
u : KAp
y, t
P1
u : KBp1
Pi = Do 
P2
u : Kgp2
P2 = Di
Do :
Di
D2 :
•••
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equivalent to the CDRS in terms of Therefore, we define another notion of informational equivalence.
Definition 6 The similarity relation, written E, is the largest class satisfying the following conditions:
• D C D' 4#. for any (i) cond(D), for some cp' E D' ,
• (S : 0") C (t : T) •#. S = t and GrET;
• x c x;
• [K xx] C [K xy] 4#. x C y ; xx] 11CxY1 <#. x C Y;
x _y4,4>xEyandyCx.
The following propositions show the basic relation between E-_- and
Proposition 1 (1) Given D and D', where cond(D) = fp : E, (u : KA D), (u : KBD), (u : KBp)} and
cond(D') = {p : E, (u : KAD'), (u : KBD')}, then D D' and D D'. (We call this proposition
Collapse proposition.)
(2) Given D and D', where cond(D) = {p : E, (u : KA D), (u : KB D), (v : KB p)} and cond(D') = {p :
E, (u : KAD'), (u : KBD')}, then D D' and D
(3) Given a CDRS D and its infinite approximation D oo , D Doo , but D Do 0.
(4) Given D and D', where cond(D) = {(u : KAD), (u : KBD')} and cond(D') = {(u : KA D'), (u :
KB D)} , then D D' and D	 . q
These are obvious by the definitions of and
3.6 On Finite Updatablity Problems
Our solution for Finite Updatability Problems is to abandon propositional interpretations of acknowledge-
ments and to adopt a procedural interpretation of them. That is, while an informing is interpreted as an
action of openning a CDRS, an acknowledgement is interpreted as an action of closing a CDRS. While
an open CDRS represent unshared assumptions, a closed CDRS represent shared information.
We can define a CDRS of (3) Du, = (label(D„,),dom(D,),cond(D,,),Closed) as an iterate approach
of shared information by a transfinite iteration:
cond(Do) = {(u: KAP)}, dom(Do) = {u, B, Do},
cond(D,04 ) = {(u : KxDa) }, dorn(Da+ i ) = {Da+ 1 }, if X utters 'I accepted ...',
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. This CDRS is constructed in a finite number of steps and it represents shared
u, A, B, p, x
u : KAD u : KBD
u :  KAp 
y,t
p: (t : y collapse)
y = x
D:
q:
example, the CDRS of (6) is: D1 , which is not bisimilar to the CDRS of
q, v
v : A knowq
y,t
y : USSR
(t : y collapse)
y = x
q, v
v : A knowq
V  
y,t
q: 
y : USSR
(t : y collapse)
y = x
u, A, B, p, x
u : KA D2 u : KBD2
u : K p
but Mod(D2 ) C Mod(D3 ). D2 is, rather, bisimilar to:
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cond(Dw ) = U cond(Da), dorn(Dw ) = U dom(D a ), q
cr<to
We can construct a iterate model of 'sharing' from the discourse representation, but the process will not
terminate in any finite number of steps. In this algorithm we can construct the previously defined D.
On the other hand, in the case of (4), by the Construction Algorithm we generate CDRS:
information.
3.7 On Coherence and Well-Groundedness Problems
Coherence Problems and Well-Groundedness Problems are related to the essence of the well-definability
of circular objects. In ISTD, we license the existence of circluarly incoherent objects and anti-grounded
objects, but they are removed from models of propositions, i.e., the reality. In section 3.4 we defined
the notion of models which excludes circulary incoherent or non-well-grounded objects with respect to
mutual dependency.
Lemma 2 There is no model of circularly incoherent or non-well-grounded objects with respect to mutual
dependency.	 q
It is obvious by the definition of models. Therefore, any CDRS of dialogue (1) and (2) has no model.
3.8 On Mis-collapse Problems
Our solution of Mis-collapse Problems is based on the Collapse proposition (see Proposition 1-(1)). For
u, A, B, p, x
u : KAD i u : KBDi
u : KBp
(7): D2
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u, A, B, p, x
U : KAD3
U : KBD3
U : K p
y, t
y : USSR
(t : y collapse)
y = x
Therefore, D2 can be collapsed into D3 but D 1 can not. Thus, if D and D'D3:
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are bisimilar and D' has less conditions than D, then D can be collapsed into D' .
4 Conclusion
ISTD and Four Classes of Circularity Problems
ISTD is a promising model of dialogue, which combine discourse models with logics of common knowl-
edge and theories of belief revision. However, ISTD has some problems which are deeply connected to
circularity. Though, we have shown that if we reconsider the ontology of proposition and shared infor-
mation, then these problems become not only solved but also a touchstone of more fine-grained models
of dialogue. This paper's method consists of two parts:
• definitions of problematic objects, and
• definitions of models which avoid such objects.
And by the Construction Algorithm we can construct CDRS' of problematic dialogues. This means
that we admit the existence of such problematic objects, but that we show a method of avoiding them.
Therefore, we need such an intervening representation as a CDRS.
The Proper Treatment of Four Classes of Circularity Problems
Barwise and Etchemendy [5] say,
Paradoxes in any domain are important: they force us to make explicit assumptions usually
left implicit, and to test those assumptions in limiting cases. Whats's more, a common thread
runs through the solution of many of the well-known paradoxes, namely, the uncovering of
some hidden parameter, a parameter whose value shifts during the reasoning that leads to
the paradox. — The Liar [5], 171.
This phrase is the phrase on which our paper found. We have pointed out the existence of the four
classes of circularity problems on information sharing, and uncovered the hidden parameters behind
them, namely, the shared situations. To say 'I don't know' about shared information/situations leads
incoherence, since to say something is a public action, namely shared. To say 'I know that' about shared
information/situations leads vacuity. To prove 'we have shared information/situations' without using the
shared information/situations leads infinity. To identify shared information/situations without using the
shared information/situation leads problems. These are the lessons we have gained from the Four Classes
of Circularity Problems.
This characterization is applicable to the other circular objects, generally? Not verified yet, probably
this characterization is connected with the liar paradox, the semantic paradox, Russell paradox, Gi5del's
undecidability, and so on. However, the investigation of this connection is of out of our aim.
N. Ogata
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